Intersecting Languages in Psychoanalysis and Philosophy

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The introduction establishes a general view of the literature in which philosophers have profited from their encounters with analysis. It provides a frame within which to present more specific ideas about the method and language of psychoanalysis as viewed by philosophers.

The method of interpretive reconstruction is unfolded from its original context of Freud's archaeological analogy. Further, the vocabulary of reconstruction, which is an intimate part of this analogy, is employed by Anna Freud in her discussion of defense mechanisms. Texts are cited and explicated. Meanwhile, the method of reconstruction is given independent, though related, application in the work of R. G. Collingwood, an archaeologist-philosopher-historian.

The juxtapostion of Freud and Collingwood suggests that the methods of philosophy and analysis are more alike than the particular problems they try to solve. Both methods are oriented toward solving the problem of discovering meaning amid absurdity. The introduction of two specific examples lends substance to this claim.

In the final section on the practice of interpretation, the question is raised as to how the introduction of the method of reconstruction affects the debate about the epistemological status of psychoanalysis as a science. Psychoanalytic knowledge shows itself to be more like that available to the historian than that accessible through physical theories. Still, physics and analysis can be compared. One must look to the interpretation of symbols. In psychoanalysis, giving an interpretation—in which nonsense becomes understandable—is a form of explanation. This methodological result suggests a conclusion about the relation between metapsychology and clinical practice.

INTRODUCTION

The interest of philosophers in the language of psychoanalysis is motivated by a number of considerations. Questions of method are particularly important.

Philosophers wonder in what way the problems and techniques of the two disciplines may be parallel and complementary. The following questions are typical of the most urgent issues that have occupied philosophers in relation to their own field. Why does one's sanity come into doubt in the treatment of deep perplexities about the self in its relation to the external world and other selves? How does amnesia, or forgetfulness, contribute to the emergence of philosophic confusion? In what way is the treatment of a philosophic problem a therapeutic enterprise?

The way these issues emerge in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* is instructive. Each remark is an occasion for reflection on the use and misuse of philosophy:

> We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider's web with our fingers. [1945, p. 46, par. 106]
> The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose. [1945, p. 50, par. 127]
> There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. [1945, p. 51, par. 133]

Philosophers are far from unanimous about Wittgenstein's contribution, except to say that it's immense. He continually combats intricate skeptical doubts with common sense and uncommonly clear diagnosis of the perplexity. With the promise of self-knowledge on the horizon, Wittgenstein sets out to map the limits of what can be said from within the bounds of language (1921, p. 149, par. 6.5). But the discipline of his project is not supposed to be a substitute for life itself. Both his writings and the example of his own life show that the solution to the problem of the meaning of life is to be found only in living every single day (Janik and Toulmin, 1973, pp. 204ff.).

Our sanity is clearly at stake in skeptically questioning the existence of the external world as Descartes does in his *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1642). This provides a paradigm of the kind of intricate doubt that Wittgenstein tries to undercut. Like every good analyst, he appreciates that one cannot solve all one's problems by direct confrontation. It is necessary to employ a method which discloses implicit presuppositions. Otherwise what is at first an exercise in radical doubt becomes a tormenting inability to escape isolation and solipsism.

Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* takes up the skeptical challenge and attempts to repair the torn web of the subject's relations with others. He uses the method of "analogical apperception." The *alter ego* is sketched as a self-like-me in the analogical transference of a familiar scheme to a new situation (1970, pp. 112-113, 119). Husserl's contribution is the study of the attachment and division between subjectivites in terms of intentionality (1970, pp. 106ff.).

Turning now from phenomenology to ordinary language philosophy, John Wisdom compares the reiterated doubt of the skeptic to the compulsive questioning of the obsessional type of neurotic (1953, p. 288). He then offers a positive program for philosophy. Philosophic method consists in unmasking the hidden dimension of problems, which are structured like riddles and paradoxes. The philosopher wins peace of mind and autonomy in the face of doubt by revealing what's disguised, by disclosing the implicit.

Philosophic paradoxes emerge because we forget the context of use in which our concepts were first formed. The task of "assembling reminders" aims at overcoming this amnesia. Here there is a significant parallel, which goes back to Plato's *Meno*, between the languages of Freud and Wittgenstein. When learning is defined in terms of recollection, the thinker's project becomes one of struggling against forgetfulness (*Meno*, p. 81d).

The therapeutic dimension of philosophy attempts to give the ultimate philosophic questions—those of freedom, God, and immortality—a proper place in thought. They lie at the limits of conceptual intelligibility. These questions inevitably transcend the limits of any language whose field of reference is sense perception. They are undecidable through use of our finite senses.

Questions about such supersensuous objects as freedom, God, and the immortal self (soul) are the proper subject of metaphysics. Nevertheless, they are questions whose consideration enriches life. They press forward for reflection at crucial times no matter how often science correctly demonstrates them to be unsolvable. They show man in his most anxious and vulnerable moments as he faces death, life, and the finitude of his time in the world of men. If approached with the right method—perhaps that of Socratic midwifery (*Theaetetus*, p. 150b)—the engagement of these questions yields that hard-to-attain philosophic treasure, self-knowledge.

Further incentive for philosophers' interests in psychoanalysis is provided by significant philosophic interpretations of Freud's works. In what is basically a confrontation between Freud and Marx, Herbert Marcuse focuses on the dialectics of guilt and cultural discontent. He extends the notion of repression to the collective enterprise of production and consumption. According to him, the prevailing mode of the reality principle is the performance principle. He deserves credit for representing analysis not as a mere epistemological exercise but as a method of healing and personality change. The transformation of analysis into a method of social change that criticizes this prevailing mode of the reality principle and formulates an alternative is a more questionable move than the former. His ultimate vision is one of replacing the rationality of performance, based on scarcity, with a higher rationality of creativity, based on abundance. In the end Marcuse admits that Freud's psychological categories have been transformed into political ones (*Eros and Civilization*, 1955, pp. viii, xvii).

From another perspective, Paul Ricoeur provides a detailed reading of Freud in an essay on interpretation (*Freud and Philosophy*, 1970). The argument of this work is based on a careful study of texts, and outlines the way in which analysis is a "mixed discourse." The dynamic approach of the conflict of forces, with its constancy principle, is summarized under the term "energetics." The method of interpretation, the deciphering of dreams and symptoms as the recollection of meaning, is called "hermeneutics." These two styles of discourse are complementary: hermeneutics without energetics is empty; but energetics without hermeneutics is purposeless. The ultimate inseparability of these two forms of discourse corresponds, in philosophic terms, to the dualism of the body and the mind. Energetics is the field of biological drives and forces in conflict, while hermeneutics (interpretation) is the focus of human meaning, intention, and purpose. This dichotomy recalls George Klein's distinction between two different analytic theories (1973). According to Klein, "serious incompatibilities" exist between the thermodynamic model in metapsychology and the unlocking of meaning by interpretation in clinical practice (1973, p. 107). We'll consider Klein's proposed solution below in light of his assertions about Freud's philosophy of science.

Finally, questions about the method of psychoanalysis often engage philosophers of science. A significant part of this discussion focuses on the dichotomy between theory and observation in science and analysis (Nagel, 1959; Hartmann, 1959). Both philosophers and analysts are bewitched by a particular view of the experimental method in science. It's easy to forget that the theories of today are the special cases of tomorrow. We should assemble reminders that the distinction between theoretical language and observational language has as much to do with a particular philosophic interpretation of science as with the actual practice of the scientific method. Here the work of one philosopher and historian of intellectual disciplines deserves recognition (Toulmin, 1953, 1972). Toulmin distinguishes between the rationality characteristic of the logical relations between the elements of a formal system of explanation and the rationality of human conduct as purposive practice (1972). He transforms the distinction between theoretical and practical reason (Kant, 1787, 1788) into terms of the collective variation and selection of concepts. Here philosophy has an important contribution to make to psychoanalysis' own self-portrait in reflection on the relation between theory and practice, metapsychology and technique of interpretation. We'll return to this point, and consider some relevant literature (Klein, 1973; Mischel, 1974) in a later section.

So far the purpose of this introduction has been to establish a general view of the literature in the field. The remarks were deliberately programmatic and suggestive of the way in which philosophers have profited from their encounters with psychoanalysis. Furthermore, the task has been to provide a

frame of reference within which to present more specific ideas about the method and language of psychoanalysis as viewed by philosophers. The following sections will be less general and focus more directly on areas where Freud's discourse intersects with that of important philosophers. But two warnings are necessary. First, "intersection" means "overlap" not "identity." The point is not to reduce Freud to Wittgenstein or Collingwood—or vice versa. Rather it is to amplify, enrich, and illuminate the two disciplines, while preserving the integrity and independence of each. Only if one is secure in one's own integrity is "letting go" possible in dialogical encounter. Second, the following entails nothing either in favor or against laying the philosopher down on the analyst's couch. Following the example of Wisdom (1953) there has been a tendency to do this among philosophers themselves. Although I recognize the validity of such an approach, I don't follow it here. Rather, my main objective is to foster a fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy and psychoanalysis in which there is mutual reciprocity and self-revelation.

ARCHAEOLOGY AND ANALOGY

Freud's analogical comparison of the method of interpretation with archaeological reconstruction forms the focus of various intersecting fields of discourse. Language about the temporal genesis of structures of the mind intersects with language drawn from the spatial representation of physical ruins. The incommensurability of discourse whose reference is temporal succession with discourse whose reference is spatial extension sets a limit to the validity of this analogy.

Still Freud's archaeological analogy is of interest because it's an intermediate mode of discourse, constituting a middle level between abstract metatheoretical models and the concrete practice of specific interpretations. The analogy is valuable as a transitional construct mediating the switch from theory to practice.

The first occurrence of this analogy that I've been able to find is in the early paper "The Aetiology of Hysteria" (1896). Freud writes of an explorer entering an unknown region:

Imagine that an explorer comes in his travels to a region of which but little is known and that there his interest is aroused by ruins showing remains of walls, fragments of pillars and of tablets with obliterated and illegible inscriptions. He may content himself with inspecting what lies there on the surface and with questioning the people who live near by. . . . But he may proceed differently; he may come equipped with picks, shovels, and spades, and may . . . make an onslaught on the ruins, clear away the rub-

bish and, starting from the visible remains, may bring to light what is buried. If his work is crowned with success, the discoveries explain themselves . . . the many inscriptions, which by good luck may be bilingual, reveal an alphabet and a language, and when deciphered and translated may yield undreamed-of information about the events of the past, to commemorate which these monuments were built. *Saxa loquuntur!* [1896, p. 192]

Thus the stones speak! Meaning is discovered amid otherwise random fragments, unintelligibly absurd. In the context of his paper, Freud is arguing against the technique of asking the patient's relatives about possible sources of neurosis and even against the uncritical acceptance of what the patient tells. Understanding the neurosis is analogous to trying to decipher and translate an inscription in an unknown tongue.

Freud seems to allude to the case of the Rosetta stone, though this slab bore a trilingual inscription—Egyptian hieroglyphic, Egyptian demotic (popular script), and Greek. Here decipherment was possible because one of the languages, Greek, was already known. Comparison of the texts allowed some of the symbols to be identified, and in this lay the beginning of the translation of hieroglypic, which was previously considered undecipherable (Forde-Johnston, pp. 50-51). Similarly, the work of the psychoanalyst is furthered by the factor of overdetermination. The same message is repeated in the context of many different complexes, and the same complex repeats many different messages. This element of redundancy facilitates decipherment of the meaning of symptoms.

Freud's commitment to the archaeological analogy can be appreciated in the fact that some thirty-four years later he is still employing it for the teaching of psychoanalysis. When Freud needs a way of representing the unconscious aspects of the mind in relation to consciousness, he turns to the analogy of the ancient city (1930, p. 69). It is no accident that he speaks about one particular city, namely, Rome. Of course, this choice is determined by personal preference. But furthermore Rome is the "eternal city." Likewise the unconscious is "timeless": the primary processes of the unconscious are not altered by the passage of time.

Here Freud's language intersects explicitly with that of Wittgenstein. The analogy of the ancient city is used by Wittgenstein to illuminate the historical accretion of the forms of speech that convey men's thoughts:

Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses. [1945, p. 8, par. 18]

Language is an ancient city with new and old figures of speech and forms of expression. The historical accumulation of these forms of speech and action (or language games) is represented by the patchwork of old and new streets and houses. The suggestion is that language houses our thoughts. Furthermore, the emphasis on avenues and streets implies that language is the vehicle that gives direction to thought. (In Rome street signs meaning "one way" read *senso unico*. Thus direction and sense are intimately related.) Language channels and directs the course of thought in a way analogous to the relation between the traffic channeled by the streets and squares.

The language of science is made of straight, regular streets. Philosophy consists of old and new houses with additions from various periods. Perhaps psychoanalysis is an avenue running diagonally through town, cutting across many major thoroughfares. All these different language games crisscross like avenues and streets. In themselves they are neither true nor false. The crucial test of validity is the practioner's ability to use them to get where he wants to go.

Of course, Freud's use of the ancient city analogy is different than Wittgenstein's. He wants to teach that in mental life nothing which has once been formed can perish (1930, p. 69). But the introduction of the analogy of Rome's defensive walls has interesting consequences, of which Freud may have been only peripherally aware. He does not introduce the topic of psychic defense mechanisms; but the analogy is admirably suited to exemplify such a topic:

> We ask ourselves how much a visitor, whom we will suppose to be equipped with the most complete historical and topographical knowledge, may still find left of these early stages in the Rome of today. Except for a few gaps, he will see the wall of Aurelian almost unchanged. In some places he will be able to find sections of the Servian wall where they have been excavated and brought to light. If he knows enough—more than presentday archaeology does—he may perhaps be able to trace out in the plan of the city the whole course of that wall . . . . [1930, p. 69]

Although primitive psychic structures and defenses have been replaced by modern ones, still the foundations remain. Here the intersection of discourse about spatial walls with that about psychic defense mechanisms is furthered by the semantic richness of the concept of defense. The task of the archaeologist is to reconstruct the physical defense perimeter of the city. Likewise the practice of analysis involves the retrospective reconstruction of the ego's defensive operations (A. Freud, 1936, p. 28). "Defense" becomes the focal term of the analogy between the ancient city and the personality. The focus is what the elements of the analogy share. It is that through which the analogy yields results.

Now let's turn to another text. Freud compares himself to a conscientious archaeologist:

> In the face of the incompleteness of my analytic results, I had no choice but to follow the example of those discoverers whose good fortune it is to bring to the light of day after their long burial the priceless thought muti-lated relics of antiquity. I have restored what is missing, taking the best models known to me from other analyses; but like a conscientious archae-ologist I have not omitted to mention in each case where the authentic parts end and my construction begins. [1905, p. 12]

There is a parallel relation between buried relics and forgotten memories. We can schematize this relation formally according to the proportion: *buried/relics = forgotten/memories*. But the analogy is not merely formal. There is a common focus of meaning through which the equal sign ("=") has signifi-cance. That focus is the method of reconstruction, which allows one to restore what is hidden to integrity and wholeness in a context of meaning.

The forgotten memories represent what is behind the repression barrier on the right-hand side of the proportion. Reconstruction amounts to a recollec-tion of meaning (Ricoeur, 1972, p. 28). Otherwise unintelligible fragments are reinstituted in a complex totality, which is posited as the original matrix of their meaning.

The method of reconstruction is oriented toward interpretation. Recon-struction is a global concept embracing many particular interpretations of dream symbols, associations, screen memories, slips of tongue and pen, symp-tomatic behavior, etc. Reconstruction is the total story in which the mecha-nisms of displacement, condensation, reversal into opposite, allusion, and consideration of pictorial representation find application. Reconstruction necessarily goes beyond the given fragments, but it must always proceed from them and return to them. The relation of the individual parts to the whole must be a coherent one. Every fragment must find a place in the unified ges-talt. A fragment doesn't become intelligible until it is related to a larger con-text of meaning, which it either supports or disconfirms. Random fragments are inadmissible in a coherent and adequate interpretation.

Freud again uses the language of reconstruction in his late paper "Con-struction in Analysis" (1937), where he says of the analyst:

> His work of construction, or, if it is preferred, of reconstruction, resem-bles to a great extent an archaeologist's excavation of some dwelling-place that has been destroyed and buried or of some ancient edifice. . . . Just as the archaeologist builds up the walls of the building from the foundations that have remained standing, determines the number and position of the columns from depressions in the floor and reconstructs the mural decora-

tions and paintings from the remains found in the debris, so does the analyst proceed when he draws his inference from the fragments of memories from the behavior of the subject of the analysis. [1937, p. 259]

This way of characterizing the practice of making interpretations is taken over by Anna Freud. The problem is that one cannot obtain knowledge of mental phenomena until they impinge on the sphere of the ego, which is the seat of observation. The operation of defense is not accessible until it is loosened and undone in the working-through process of analysis. This points toward the indispensability of reconstruction for understanding the relation between the various psychic institutions. According to Anna Freud,

> All the defensive measures of the ego against the id are carried out silently and invisibly. The most that we can ever do is to reconstruct them in retrospect.

> Only the analysis of the ego's unconscious defensive operations can enable us to reconstruct the transformations which the instincts have undergone. [1936, pp. 8, 26]

In this context the language of reconstruction represents an intermediate discourse between the metapsychological institutions of id, ego, and superego and the interpretive practice of undoing defenses. The metapsychological institutions provide a theoretic model of dynamic forces in conflict. The practice of undoing defenses involves a confrontation with the ambivalence of human emotions emerging in the context of the transference relation, where the analyst and analysand are purposively engaged in seeking the answers to questions of their own formulation. The method of reconstruction is valuable as a transitional function mediating the move from discourse about the causal efficacy of forces in conflict to discourse about human emotions and purposes.

Now the languages of philosophy and analysis intersect again in the specific field of the method of reconstruction. Collingwood offers some reflections on the practice of reconstruction in the context of the history of philosophy and aesthetics (1938, p. 107). Besides being a philosopher of art, metaphysics, science, and history, Collingwood was an expert on the history of Roman Britain. Thus he was a practicing archaeologist. He made important contributions to the understanding of the function of Roman fortifications in Britain thanks to his capacity for empathizing with the intentions and purposes of their builders (1939, pp. 128-130). Collingwood developed a method of analysis for discovering truth amid the apparent absurdity and falsehood of mistaken philosophic theories:

An erroneous philosophical theory is based in the first instance not on ignorance but on knowledge. The person who constructs it begins by partially understanding the subject, and goes on to distort what he knows by twisting it into conformity with some preconceived ideas. . . . If the truth which underlies it is to be separated out from the falsehood, a special method of analysis must be used. This consists in isolating the preconceived idea which has acted as the distorting agent, reconstructing the formula of the distortion, and reapplying it so as to correct the distortion and thus find out what it was that the people who invented or accepted the theory were trying to say. [1938, p. 107]

Thus philosophic theories have the structure of symptoms: they are compromise formations. The compromise is between truth, such as it is, and preconceived ideas or prejudice. Collingwood doesn't mention another equally important point, namely, that the theory's capacity of representation may be inadequate to express the truths and modes of knowledge over which the theory ranges. Thus an element of distortion would be inevitable in setting up any formal system.

The reader may well feel that Freud himself could have written the foregoing quote, with certain appropriate substitutions. Compare the text with one from Freud, published at about the same time:

The essence of it is that there is not only *method* in madness, as the poet has already perceived, but also a fragment of historical truth. . . .

Just as our construction is only effective because it recovers a fragment of lost experience, so the delusion owes its convincing power to the element of historic truth which it inserts in the place of rejected reality. [1937, p. 267]

The delusions of the narcissistic neuroses (1917, pp. 422ff.) are an attempt to reestablish contact with a reality that has been rejected and lost. Insofar as they contain an element of historic truth, they represent a distorted attempt at a cure or recovery (1915, p. 203).

Let us schematize the interdisciplinary analogy implicit in this comparison of Freud and Collingwood. We come up with the following proportion: *erroneous philosophic theory = knowledge = delusion = historic truth*. The area of intersection is defined by this analogy is the method of construction as means of discovering meaning amid absurdity. The focal meaning, which makes the analogy a source of insight, is the construction through which the separation of error and knowledge, distortion and truth, can be attained.

Until the philosopher invents and applies his formula of reconstruction, the theory on which he is working may seem riddled with contradictions and un-

intelligible paradoxes. But the formula of reconstruction enables him to grasp the nucleus of truth that the author was trying to express. Likewise, without reconstructive analysis, the delusions of psychiatric patients seem absurd. The analyst's method of reconstruction loosens the apparent absurdity through the assumption that the delusion is a distorted reflection of some psychic or inter-personal reality. However maladaptive the delusion may be in the long run, it is still a way of mastering anxiety that is immediately present and destructive-ly overpowering. The method of reconstruction respects the delusion. This is the first step in discovering the experience for which the delusion is a substi-tute. Then the method of reconstruction places the historic dimension in per-spective and lays out the kernel of truth as well as the husk of illusion.

EXAMPLES

At this point the best way of amplifying the method of reconstruction is by means of examples. I would like to lay out the way in which neurosis can ex-press a kernel of historic truth in terms of Freud's Dora (1905). My remarks are based on a close reading of this case history, and they presuppose to some extent familiarity with the complex personal relations obtaining in Dora's universe of family and friends. I want to argue that one of Dora's central fan-tasies, in terms of which many of her symptoms are emotional ambivalences become intelligible is just this: "Sexual intercourse makes one sick."

This last statement, then, is the formula of distortion. How did I arrive at it? To paraphrase Collingwood, Dora's hysterical symptoms are based not on ignorance but on knowledge. She formed an understanding of the relations between the sexes based on the model of the relationship obtaining between her mother and father. But her mother married a man with venereal disease and contracted it from him. The mother reacted to the infection by becoming very strict, even compulsive, about cleanliness. She developed what Freud calls a "housewife psychosis" (1905, p. 20). Dora's fantasy that intercourse makes one sick is based on an unwarranted generalization from the one ex-ceptional case of her parents.

Obviously, Dora's problem is not so much a matter of faulty logic as of faulty models on the basis of which to reason. The nucleus of historic truth at the foundation of Dora's unconscious fantasy about the relation between sex and sickness is her correct perception of her mother's relation to the father. The historic truth is experienced realistically by the mother: "Sexual inter-course makes one sick [if one's partner has venereal disease]." This is the formula of distortion with the kernel of historic truth reinstated.

This is the point at which the reconstruction is no longer supported by spe-cific facts and is transformed into a story. In order to reconstruct Dora's (mis) perception we must hypothetically consider the effect on Dora of experiencing

her mother's reaction to infection from the father. How was this state of af-
fairs transmitted from parents to child? Whether they know it or not, parents
continually teach their children in a form which uses no words, namely, by
their example. What is a conscious reality for the parents (i.e., sexual inter-
course can be a source of syphilis) must be redescribed as an unconscious fan-
tasy in the child. And unless this fantasy is tested against reality by being ex-
pressed, it remains detached and isolated. As a source of anxiety, such fantasy
gets split off, and so remains descriptively unconscious.

There is textual evidence in the story of Dora to support my view about the
formula of distortion in Dora's fantasy life. According to Freud:

> To Dora that must mean that all men were like her father. But she
> thought her father suffered from venereal disease—for had he not handed
> it on to her and her mother? She might therefore have imagined to herself
> that *all men suffered from venereal disease*, and naturally her conception
> of venereal disease was modelled upon her one experience of it—a personal
> one at that. To suffer from venereal disease, therefore, meant for her to be
> afflicted with a disguisting discharge. [1905, p. 84; italics my own]

It is a short step from Freud's proposition about Dora's fantasy "all men suf-
fered from venereal disease" to the view "sexual intercourse makes one sick."

Unfortunately, this text is problematic for other reasons. Freud seems to
imply that Dora's father handed his venereal disease on to her, that the dis-
ease was hereditary. But this was a view he later qualified and rejected in light
of advance in medical research.

But Freud may have unwittingly hit upon the truth anyway. Dora's father
did hand his symptom on to his daughter, only it was psychically, not phy-
sically, determined. As a psychically determined symptom Dora's vaginal
catarrh (leukorrhea) is a compromise formation. It is an inflammation of the
sexual membrane expressing ambivalence about sexual intercourse in light of
Dora's fantasy about the proximity of sex and sickness. On the one hand, it
expresses sexual arousal in an obvious way—the tissue is swollen and excited.
A substance is discharged in preparation to receive the male. On the other
hand, the symptom expresses a rejection of the idea of intercourse—the dis-
charge is an infected, moibid one (1905, p. 84).

The otherwise enigmatic and recalcitrant symptom of a catarrh is intelligi-
ble as the expression of the wish to copulate incestuously with the father and
the simultaneous expression of a punishment for this forbidden wish. Under
this interpretation Dora's catarrh would be an example of hysterical venereal
disease. But this symptom would also be typically overdetermined as an iden-
tification with the father, for she has the same disease as the father, as well as
the expression of the wish to replace the mother in intercourse with the father.